



THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
JOHN GLENN COLLEGE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public Affairs 7535
Regulation: Power and Control in Economic Life
Spring 2020
3 Credits

Instructor

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Time and Location

Times: Tu, Th 3:55-5:15 pm
Location: Page Hall 240

Course Overview

How is economic life governed and controlled in the early 21st century? How do we—and how should we—manage the ebb and flow of economic production and exchange, the use of resources, the allocation of public goods, and the distribution of social costs? Where should such regulatory power be vested? By what means? To what ends? What can we learn from the past? Where do we find ourselves now? This last question is especially important; whatever the precise characteristics of the present political-economic moment, it increasingly seems like we have reached a turning point: just as the so-called neoliberal era of markets and deregulation is said to have eclipsed an earlier era of state control and public mandates, the regulatory earth once again feels like it may be shifting beneath our feet. Some signs point towards a renewed embrace of state control in economic life. Other shifts retain the signature of alternative, market-oriented, and non-state systems of regulation and governance. However we characterize these developments, from environmental protection to finance to urban development and new forms of work, configurations of power and control in the economy are once again changing. (Maybe they always are?) Questions of regulation and governance are as fresh and as important as ever.

This graduate seminar provides an intensive introduction to the topic of “regulation,” broadly defined, in both the United States and around the world. *In essence, we will study how power and politics structure and shape economic life.* For future researchers and scholars, the aim is to provide a foundation in essential literature and to build an intellectual

platform for diagnosing and explaining contemporary forms of power and control in modern economies, always with an eye for applications to pressing real-world problems, active debates, and vanguards of contemporary scholarship. For current or future practitioners, the aim is to situate real-world problems and contemporary challenges in larger historical context and to provide theoretical insights and analytical tools for thinking through “the bigger picture” that is so easily lost in the daily grind of public-sector, non-profit, and private-sector work. Whatever your future plans, whether you aspire to join a university faculty, a think tank, a non-profit, a private firm, or a public agency, the stakes are equally high: for all of us, in an era of rapid technological change, shifting global climate, soaring inequality, and growing populism and nationalism around the world, few questions are thornier, more politically fraught, or more fundamental than how to manage and control day-to-day economic activity. Which is all to say, in this seminar, we have our work cut out for ourselves.

Over the course of the semester, we will tackle these big questions of “regulation” in three parts:

1. **Foundations:** For the first four weeks of the class, we grapple with foundational and fundamental questions of regulation: how does regulation—particularly economic regulation—work? What explains it? How is power wielded to control economic behavior? What is the relation between regulation and bureaucracy? What are the roles of bureaucrats themselves? What about institutions? And how should we understand contemporary trends like deregulation or the apparent growth of non-state and private forms of regulatory control?
2. **Complications:** In the second four weeks of the class, we delve deeper into more subtle features of regulation: we upend widely held popular beliefs that regulation follows from law; we consider the ways that business manipulates and strategically games regulatory systems; we consider the widely overlooked activist and reformist roles often played by bureaucrats themselves; we investigate the ways that the political and administrative architecture of the state itself influences regulatory politics; we consider the influence of social movements; and we contemplate the ways regulations—or a lack thereof—can inspire backlashes and movements of their own.
3. **Wicked Problems:** Finally, in the last six weeks of the course, we delve into pressing “wicked” problems of the day, considering how these problems are—and ought to be—addressed by regulatory means. This section of the course does double duty: we investigate particular substantive areas—environmental regulation; health and consumer safety regulation; worker protections; questions of surveillance and privacy in the digital age—while we also explore contemporary patterns and trends in modern regulatory systems: the growing use of markets as regulatory instruments; the ways new technologies may change regulatory systems; the role of collaborative governance in regulatory systems; and so on.

Learning Goals and Objectives

This course is designed to provide an advanced introduction to the topic of “regulation,” broadly defined, for any student interested in the ways that economic processes, also broadly

defined, are governed and controlled in modern economies. A strong background in social science is recommended but not required; the readings draw from sociology, economics, political science, history, geography, business, and the field of public affairs itself. The course contributes to all Glenn College Program Learning Objectives related to graduate-level knowledge in policy, economics, management, and decision-making support. Engaged students will be especially well-equipped to:

- Describe the environmental context of public problem solving (including political, economic, and cultural dimensions—in a word, the “social” environment);
- Identify the basic elements of the public policy process (especially in extra-legislative and non-state contexts);
- Know how to use the policy process to advance the public interest (especially in so-called “regulatory” contexts);
- Understand the connections between public problems, policy content, policy systems and public programs (i.e. develop a sense of historical specificity and the policy process);
- Evaluate how differences in policy content and systems contribute to policy outputs and outcomes (i.e. understand and theorize political and policy feedbacks);
- Apply and communicate private and public sector methods of addressing violations of the neoclassical model (and moving beyond such a model in the first place);
- Identify and manage external/environmental challenges to organizational performance.

Course Materials

There are no required texts for this course. All readings and supplemental materials will be posted on Carmen, are freely available online, or will otherwise be distributed to students.

Course Requirements

You have to do six things in this class: (1) read; (2) submit one or more questions about the reading before each class; (3) write five short (~1-2 page) response memos on readings/classes of your choice; (4) write two longer (~4-5 page) response memos on broader course topics of your choice; (5) lead one class discussion of your choice; (6) produce one final “deliverable” that we (you and I) agree upon, ideally something of direct use to you, with your current/future career in mind. Each of these requirements is outlined in detail below.

1. **Assigned Readings** - Not graded.

You must come to class prepared to discuss all assigned readings in-depth and with nuance and sophistication. This will not always be easy. Some of the readings are hard; you may struggle with them. Even when you do, though, you should still strive to identify both the central arguments in a given set of texts and also the deeper and

more subtle points that arise from each individual reading. There is no mandated set of questions you have to answer as you read, but a useful set of things to keep in mind includes:

- Central argument/finding;
- Data used;
- Methods used;
- Implicit or explicit scope conditions (including the historical and geographical specificity of the argument, which is often implicit);
- Theoretical starting points and founding assumptions;
- Secondary and tertiary findings;
- Implications for future research;
- Linkages, similarities, contrasts, and differences across readings.

The last point about similarities and differences is especially important: I will consistently ask you to think carefully and systematically about how the readings relate, why they might have been assigned together, and how they might speak to and inform one another.

I caution you at the outset that the only assumption you can make about a reading on the syllabus is that I judge it to be insightful and useful or provocative—not that it is “good” or “bad” or “right” or “wrong.” Such simplistic categorizations are unlikely to be useful in this course. Critique is welcome, but I strongly encourage you to strive for an *immanent critique*: before moving outside the argument and evidence as presented in a reading (e.g., “so-and-so did not consider such-and-such,” or, “the author(s) focused on *x* when they should have focused on *y*,” etc.), try to focus on questions, concerns, and criticisms that develop *within* the argument as presented: alternative interpretations of the same data, misunderstandings or logical missteps or oversights that emerge out of the reading’s own arguments or claims, and so on. There is, of course, an important place for calling for different kinds of research or pushing for asking different kinds of questions, but our primary goal will always be to dig *into* the readings before moving beyond them, so as to understand and to learn from the authors—granting that their work, like our own, will always have limitations and flaws. More generally, I encourage you to remember that talk—and thus critique—is cheap, while the creative work of actually parsing through data and making an insightful, generative argument is very, very hard. So is actually formulating policy or implementing the law in “real life.” We all have lots to learn from these efforts, in order to understand them and in order to move beyond them.

2. Q & R (Question and Rationale) - 10% of final grade.

For all classes when you do not submit a memo (see (3) and (4) below), you must submit at least one insightful, incisive question that engages with one or more of the assigned readings. You also need to pair that question with a brief rationale. Only one question and rationale is required per class; more are okay but multiple questions should be distinct, not just elaborations of the same question. Your question(s) and

rationale(s) should be short: strive to keep each to a single sentence. You can ask clarifying questions, questions about theoretical assumptions, questions about method, questions about concepts or ideas across readings (in the same class or reaching back to previous classes); questions about applications or examples—anything, really, is fair game. Your rationale for each question should be a simple justification for why you asked the question in the first place: why you think your question is important, what difference the implied shift in argument or change in data might make to the authors' argument, why you were confused or unclear about something, what implications your question has for the linkages between one or more readings, how your question relates to previous class discussions, how an analysis or reading relates to a case or example you know of, etc.

Post your Q & R on Carmen; they will help guide class discussion and will provide fodder to help the assigned discussion leader (or the professor!) run the class (see #5 below). **Q & R submissions are due at noon before class.**

3. Short Response Memos - 25% of final grade.

For five of the classes/weeks over the course of the semester, you must write a brief response memo (~1-2 pages double-spaced; ~250-500 words) on the assigned readings for that class/week. These short memos can reach across classes within a given week (i.e. synthesize readings from both Tuesday and Thursday classes) or focus on just one class. You can pick which five classes/weeks you to write on—any and all are fine by me. I advise getting some of the memos out of the way early on, but how you space them out is up to you so long as you submit five in total over the course of the semester.

While short, these response memos should dig into central points, deeper questions, and broader connections that emerge within and between readings. The specific format can vary, but you may find it useful to focus on:

- Implications, ideas, concepts, arguments that you found stimulating, worth remembering, and useful for building on;
- Questions, concerns, disagreements that you might have with ideas you encounter;
- Connections, linkages, contradictions between one idea or approach and another within and between readings.

However you approach the short memos, I urge you to stay focused on the argument and evidence as presented by the authors, and the implications that follow from that presentation. See the discussion of immanent critique above, in (1).

Submit your short memos on Carmen; like the Q & R, these memos should be public so that your classmates can learn from your insights—and so you can learn from theirs. A formal works cited page is not required, but in-text (author, year, page) citations for the course readings should be included where you cite specific passages. **Short memos are due at noon before class.**

4. Long Response Memos - 20% of final grade.

For two of the weeks/topics of your choice, you must prepare a more detailed, longer response memo (~4-5 pages; ~800-1200 words) analyzing and synthesizing the weekly readings. Aside from a deeper analysis afforded by more space, two additional features set the long response memos apart from the short response memos:

- (a) Your long memos must be focused on a weekly topic, not an individual class. That means they must be synthetic, bringing together ideas and insights from readings across *both* classes within a given week—and also other readings from other weeks if you like.
- (b) As with the short memos, you can choose which week's readings you wish to focus on, but you must submit your long memos *before* the first (i.e. Tuesday) class when we discuss the topic. This means that when you write your long memos, you will have to read ahead: you will need to read both Tuesday's *and* Thursday's class material before Tuesday—generally, four articles/book selections in total. You will then be something of an expert on the topic for the week; it will informally become part of your responsibility to help lead discussion on the topic for the week.

The purpose of the longer memos is to help you grapple with the readings and respond with questions, criticisms, and new ideas in a deeper, more sophisticated way than is possible in the short response memos. While it is still important to identify and briefly elaborate the central arguments of the readings in a long memo, the main thrust of the longer memos should be on developing promising research ideas suggested by the readings (especially for Ph.D. students) and applying the ideas to real-world cases or experiences (especially for MA/MPA students). If you wish to use the memos as a vehicle for furthering your own work, that's wonderful. When you choose to write a longer memo about a particular topic, you should consult the additional readings for that week as well. A formal works cited page is not required, but in-text (author, year, page) citations for the course readings should be included. Long memos can be sent directly to me (rea.115 [at] osu.edu) or posted to Carmen—up to you. **Long memos are due by 9:00 am on Tuesday mornings.**

5. Participation and Leading Class Discussion - 15% of final grade.

For one class during the semester, you will become the professor: it will be your job to lead class discussion and to guide the rest of us through the readings and important ideas contained within them. It may be wise to pair this responsibility with one of your memos. For the class that you teach, I will meet with you in advance to discuss the readings and to help you refine your lesson plan; we can arrange this meeting in-person the week before the class you will teach. How you approach teaching is up to you: you can plan a lecture (although this class is designed to be a seminar, so discussion should be incorporated), an activity or game, bring in outside materials (video or audio clips), etc. I only ask that you do not assign additional work—we have enough of that as-is! You will have a chance to pick the class you want to teach at the start of the second class of the semester after you've had time to read through the syllabus carefully and

get a taste of what the course will be like. This activity will contribute $\frac{1}{3}$ (5% of 15%) of your participation grade.

In addition to leading a class discussion, you will also be graded on your participation in class, both in-person and (if you don't speak up much in class) online. This is a seminar; you are expected to participate frequently and thoughtfully. This also means you have to come to class (see attendance policy, below). The success of the class depends upon it! Such engagement will contribute $\frac{2}{3}$ (10% of 15%) of your participation grade.

6. **Final Project** - 30% of final grade.

The culminating project for this course will be a self-designed and student-generated “deliverable” negotiated between you and me (the professor). Collaboration is possible and even encouraged; group projects are fully acceptable. The goal is to produce a course-related product that is useful to you—that, in other words, will help you push your career ahead.

If you are an aspiring academic, the final product you aim for might be the literature review for a paper you hope to write someday; a preliminary exploration of a question or area of research you'd like to pursue; an annotated syllabus for a “regulation” (or “tech governance” or “environmental policy” or similar) course you would love to teach in the future; a grant or fellowship proposal closely related to the course content; or, depending on your stage as a student and your level of ambition, the draft of a paper that you would like to eventually submit for publication. This last option is especially ambitious, but I am open to negotiating it depending on your career stage, level of interest, and the promise of the idea/paper.

If you are a current or aspiring practitioner, all of the above options are open to you, too, but you may also want to conduct a stakeholder analysis and develop an action plan for pursuing an administrative rule change you/your organization wants to push for; draft a careful response (public comment) to a proposed rule change relevant to your work/organization; explore and develop a novel interpretation of an existing rule that affects your work in ways that would help you/your organization achieve a specific goal; develop a non-state regulatory policy for your organization (e.g. a specific corporate social responsibility policy/practice); or develop an action plan for wielding non-state regulatory power (e.g. building a coalition or campaign to change a firm's or government's behavior without legislation or a rule change).

Other options are possible, too; we will negotiate the specifics of your final project one-on-one on a case-by-case basis. Over the course of the semester will will meet at least three times to discuss your project: once to select your topic, decide on your “deliverable”, and make sure your goal is achievable during the semester; and twice to make sure you are on-track and making good progress on your work. It is your responsibility to schedule these meetings within the general time slots I make available.

Grading

Summary of grade weights by category

Q & R Submissions:	10%
Short Response Memos (5 @ 5%):	25%
Long Response Memos (2 @ 10%):	20%
Participation and Leading Class Discussion:	15%
Final Assignment:	30%

Percent-to-letter translations

A+: n/a	B+: 88.0-89.9	C+: 78.0-79.9	D+: 68.0-69.9	E: <60
A: 93.0-100	B: 83.0-87.9	C: 73.0-77.9	D: 60.0-67.9	
A-: 90.0-92.9	B-: 80.0-82.9	C-: 70.0-72.9		

Numerical grades are rounded to the nearest 10th of a percent. Thus, a 92.96 is rounded to 93.0 (an A); 92.94 is rounded to 92.9 (an A-). 92.95 is rounded up. All final grade assignments are made at the sole discretion of the instructor. Generally, this works to the benefit of students. :)

Late Work

In general, late work is not accepted; exceptions will be made on a case-by-case basis. I understand that life can take unexpected twists and turns; I also know that you may need some flexibility to manage those challenges as they arise. In general, planned and easily foreseeable events like weddings, religious holidays (when not disclosed in advance; see below), conferences, or the requirements of other courses are *not* excuses for missing major assignments; please contact me in advance of such conflicts to make alternative arrangements if you expect to need them. If extenuating and unforeseeable circumstances do prevent you from completing a major assignment on-time, then you *must* contact the instructor as soon as possible, ideally *before* the due date and absolutely no more than 48 hours after. Generally, final assignment grades will be reduced by $\frac{1}{3}$ (A to A-; A- to B+; and so on) for each day they are late.

Religious Holidays

Absence can be excused for religious observances and students can reschedule without penalty required class work that may fall on religious holidays. These arrangements should be made as far in advance as possible, but at a minimum, 48 hours prior to the observance. Assignments, quizzes, or exams missed due to a religious observance will not be excused if a student does not provide the instructor with 48 hours of advance notice. As long as advance notice is given, however, all reasonable efforts will be made to accommodate religious conflicts.

Attendance Policy

Attendance is required and will be incorporated into your participation grade. You can miss class up to two times with no questions asked; please just notify me in advance. Any absences beyond that require documentation/discussion with me in order for them not to impact your grade.

Academic Misconduct Policy

The Ohio State University and the Committee on Academic Misconduct (COAM) expect that all students have read and understand the University's Code of Student Conduct and that all students will complete all academic and scholarly assignments with fairness and honesty. Failure to follow the rules and guidelines established in the University's Code of Student Conduct may constitute "Academic Misconduct." Sanctions for the misconduct could include a failing grade in this course and suspension or dismissal from the University.

The Ohio State University's Code of Student Conduct, Section 3335-23-04 defines academic misconduct as: "Any activity that tends to compromise the academic integrity of the University, or subvert the educational process." Examples of academic misconduct include (but are not limited to) plagiarism, collusion (unauthorized collaboration), copying the work of another student, and possession of unauthorized materials during an examination. Ignorance of the University's Code of Student Conduct is never considered an "excuse" for academic misconduct.

Glenn College Diversity Values Statement

The Glenn College is committed to nurturing a diverse and inclusive environment for our students, faculty, staff, and guests that celebrates the fundamental value and dignity of everyone by recognizing differences and supporting individuality. We are dedicated to creating a safe space and promoting civil discourse that acknowledges and embraces diverse perspectives on issues and challenges that affect our community.

Discourse and Respect in the Classroom and Beyond

Public affairs and social science more generally deals with domains of life and ideas where differences of opinion, often grounded in deeply held personal beliefs and senses of self, are almost certain to surface in discussion, both in the classroom and far beyond. "Regulation" as a topic may not seem prone to eliciting strong opinions about sensitive or "triggering" topics, but even in this class, these kinds of delicate, personal, and deeply important ideas may surface.

With this in mind, I offer a gentle reminder that it is *always* your responsibility to think carefully before you speak so that you are sure to share your ideas in ways that are not belittling and that absolutely respect others' dignity and humanity. Attacks on other people, as individuals or as groups, are inappropriate and will not be tolerated in the classroom.

At the same time, I also ask that you strive to assume positive intent on the part of others—at least as much as you reasonably can. This means that barring direct attacks, you should try your best to assume that people—including me—are at least attempting to be kind and are not trying to offend you—that, in short, their words are well-intended, even if what they say is (in your view) misguided, mean, or offensive. You are absolutely within your rights to point out this offensiveness, but again, you should always strive to do so in ways that are not themselves belittling or dehumanizing. I truly appreciate your efforts to this end; I recognize that being forgiving and compassionate in this way can be difficult and always takes presence of mind and conscious effort.

I also note that I cannot unilaterally promise that our classroom will always be a “safe space,” inasmuch as troubling and triggering ideas or topics may come up, sometimes unpredictably. As much as possible, I will try to provide advance warning of difficult and sensitive topics. If needed, please take care of yourself when we are discussing or otherwise thinking about sensitive issues. You may leave the room at anytime if you feel the need to. You can also debrief with a friend, contact a Sexual Violence Support Coordinator at 614-292-1111, or contact Counseling and Consultation Services at 614-292-5766. If you feel unsafe, disrespected, or discriminated against for *any* reason, please inform me (the instructor) or another faculty or staff member you feel comfortable speaking with. We will work to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. Per the Glenn College Diversity Values Statement above, my goal is always to “celebrate the fundamental value and dignity of everyone in the classroom by recognizing differences and supporting individuality”—and to do so in service of deep, critical, and wide-ranging intellectual engagement with the ideas and content we are studying.

Mental Health Statement

As a student you may experience a range of issues that can cause barriers to learning, such as strained relationships, increased anxiety, alcohol/drug problems, feeling down or depressed, difficulty concentrating and/or lack of motivation. These mental health concerns or stressful events may lead to diminished academic performance or reduce your ability to participate in daily activities.

The Ohio State University offers services to assist you with addressing these and other concerns you may be experiencing. If you or someone you know is suffering from any of the aforementioned conditions, you can learn more about the broad range of confidential mental health services available on campus via the Office of Student Life Counseling and Consultation Services (CCS) by visiting <http://ccs.osu.edu> or calling 614-292-5766. CCS is located on the 4th Floor of the Younkin Success Center and 10th Floor of Lincoln Tower. You can reach an on-call counselor when CCS is closed at 614-292-5766 and 24 hour emergency help is also available through the 24/7 National Suicide Prevention Hotline at 1-800-273-TALK or at <http://suicidepreventionlifeline.org>.

Also, the OSU Student Advocacy Center is a resource designed to help students navigate OSU and to resolve issues of all sorts that they encounter at the University. For more information, visit <http://advocacy.osu.edu/>.

Writing Assistance

The Writing Center is a key resource for writing assistance. The following is from their website (<https://cstw.osu.edu/students>): The Writing Center works “one-one-one with undergraduate and graduate students, faculty, and staff at Ohio State on writing projects. Writing consultants are able to review writing at any stage, from brainstorming to a final draft, as well as help with non-paper assignments such as presentations, blogs, etc.” Consultants are available by appointment, on a walk-in basis, or online.

Student Accommodation Policy

The University strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability (including mental health, chronic or temporary medical conditions), please let me (the instructor) know immediately so that we can privately discuss options for supporting your learning and success. To establish reasonable accommodations, I may request that you register with Student Life Disability Services (SLDS). After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion.

SLDS contact information:

slds@osu.edu
614-292-3307
slds.osu.edu
098 Baker Hall,
113 W. 12th Avenue.

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Part 1: FoundationsWeek 1 - Power and Control in the Economy, Part 1: Views from Economics and Sociology**Class 1 - 1/7 - Foundations 1.1 - A Classical Economic View**Primary Readings:

1. Posner, R. A. (1974). Theories of Economic Regulation. *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper*(41), 1–44.
2. Carrigan, C., & Coglianese, C. (2015). George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. In M. Lodge, E. C. Page, & S. J. Balla (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration* (pp. 287–299). Oxford University Press.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Drucker, J., & Tankersley, J. (2019). How Big Companies Won New Tax Breaks From the Trump Administration. *The New York Times, December 30*.

Supplemental Readings:

Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2*(1), 3–21.

Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. *The Journal of Law and Economics, 19*(2), 211–240.

Bó, E. D. (2006). Regulatory capture: A review. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22*(2), 203–225.

Jones, D. N. (1988). Regulatory concepts, propositions, and doctrines: Casualties and survivors. *Journal of Economic Issues, 22*(4), 1089–1108.

Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1991). The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regulatory capture. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106*(4), 1089–1127.

Class 2 - 1/9 - Foundations 1.2 - A Sociological CorrectivePrimary Readings:

1. Vogel, S. K. (2018). *Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work*. Oxford University Press, ch. 1.
2. Schneiberg, M., & Bartley, T. (2001). Regulating american industries: Markets, politics, and the institutional determinants of fire insurance regulation. *American Journal of Sociology, 107*(1), 101–146.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Markham, J. M. (1984). In a 'Dying' Forest, the German Soul Withers Too. *The New York Times*, May 25.

Supplemental Readings:

Polanyi, K. (1957). The economy as instituted process. In K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, & H. W. Pearson (Eds.), *Trade and market in the early empires* (Chap. 13, pp. 243–270). The Free Press.

Polanyi, K. ([1944] 2001). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time*. Beacon Press, pp. 59–80, 141–157.

Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), 481–510.

Granovetter, M. (2017). *Society and Economy: Framework and Principles*. Harvard University Press, pp. 135–170.

Krippner, G. R., & Alvarez, A. S. (2007). Embeddedness and the intellectual projects of economic sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33(1), 219–240.

Hooks, G. (1990). From an Autonomous to a Captured State Agency: The Decline of the New Deal in Agriculture. *American Sociological Review*, 55(1), 29–43.

Week 2 - Power and Control in the Economy, Part 2: Forms and Sources of Power**Class 3 - 1/14 - Foundations 1.3 - Considering Power More Carefully**Primary Readings:

1. Granovetter, M. (2017). *Society and Economy: Framework and Principles*. Harvard University Press, pp. 91–134.
2. Mann, M. (1993). *The sources of social power: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 44–75.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Carpenter, D. P. (2010). *Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA*. Princeton University Press, pp. 15–25.

Supplemental Readings:

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. University of California Press, pp. 941–948.

Perrow, C. (2014). *Complex organizations: A critical essay*. Echo Point Books & Media, LLC., pp. 258–278.

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003 [1978]). *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*. Stanford University Press, pp. 39–61.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). *Power in Organizations*. Marshfield, Mass: Pitman Publishing Corp., pp. 97–135.

Lukes, S. (2005). *Power, second edition: A radical view*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14–60.

Class 4 - 1/16 - Foundations 1.4 - Wither Power? Or, the Power of CulturePrimary Readings:

1. Dobbin, F. (1994). *Forging industrial policy: The united states, britain, and france in the railway age*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–27.
2. Fourcade, M. (2011). Cents and sensibility: Economic valuation and the nature of “Nature”. *American Journal of Sociology*, 116(6), 1721–77.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Mayyasi, A. (2016). How Children Went from Worthless to Priceless. *priceconomics.com*, June 30, <https://priceconomics.com/the-price-of-a-bibrangedashchild/>.

Supplemental Readings:

Fourcade, M. (2009). *Economists and societies: Discipline and profession in the united states, britain, and france, 1890s to 1990s*. Princeton University Press, pp. 1–30.

Week 3 - Bureaucracy and Administrative Control**Class 5 - 1/21 - Foundations 1.5 - Bureaucracy and Autonomy**Primary Readings:

1. Carpenter, D. P. (2001). *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton University Press, pp. 1-36, optional pp. 179-211.
2. Rourke, F. E. (1984). *Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy* (3rd edition). Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 15–47.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Watch *The Poison Squad*, a PBS documentary about the work and legacy of Dr. Harvey Wiley, who is sometimes referred to as the father of the FDA and who pioneered food safety regulation in the United States. (Wiley is also a central figure in the second portion of the Carpenter (2001) selection, above.)

As you watch, keep many of the dynamics we've discussed in class in mind: the autonomy of bureaucrats, their power and discretion to regulate, the ways that bureaucrats and agencies can leverage networks of political support to act autonomously from presidents, public interest and capture theories of regulation, the role of legitimacy crises in instituting regulation, etc. There is LOTS lurking behind the surface of the documentary—more, probably, than the filmmakers even realize. Watch the film with an eye for all of the linkages to the literature we've read and discussed in class.

Supplemental Readings:

Kaufman, H. (2006). *The forest ranger* (Special Reprint Edition). Washington, DC: Routledge.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. University of California Press, pp. 956–962, 971–983, 987–994.

Carpenter, D. P. (2010). *Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA*. Princeton University Press, pp. 33–70.

Cook, B. J. (1988). *Bureaucratic politics and regulatory reform: The epa and emissions trading*. Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated.

Lipsky, M. (2010 [1980]). *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service, 30th Anniversary Expanded Edition* (30 Anv Exp edition). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Maupin, J. R. (1993). Control, Efficiency, And The Street-Level Bureaucrat. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 3(3), 335–357.

Blau, P. M. (1972 [1955]). *The dynamics of bureaucracy*. University of Chicago Press.

Class 6 - 1/23 - Foundations 1.6 - Rule-making and Administrative PoliticsPrimary Readings:

1. Strauss, P. L. (1996). From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking. *Wake Forest Law Review*, 31, 745, pp. 1–27.
2. Yackee, J. W., & Yackee, S. W. (2006). A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy. *Journal of Politics*, 68(1), 128–139.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Friedman, L. (2019). U.S. Significantly Weakens Endangered Species Act. *The New York Times*.

Supplemental Readings:

Yackee, S. W. (2006). Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16(1), 103–124.

Yackee, J. W., & Yackee, S. W. (2010). Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”? *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory*, 20(2), 261–282.

Garland, M. B. (1985). Deregulation and Judicial Review. *Harvard Law Review*, 98(3), 505–591

Rea, C. M. (2018). Regulatory thickening and the politics of market-oriented environmental policy. *Environmental Politics*.

Week 4 - Instituting and Organizing Regulation

Class 7 - 1/28 - Foundations 1.7 - Institutions and PolycentricityPrimary Readings:

1. Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. *The American Economic Review*, 100(3), pp. 641–672.
2. Wilson, J., Yan, L., & Wilson, C. (2007). The precursors of governance in the Maine lobster fishery. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 104(39), 15212–15217.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Watch the short lecture, “[Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons](#),” featuring the late Elinor Ostrom and made available by the Stockholm Resilience Centre.

Supplemental Readings:

Ostrom, E. (2009). A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. *Science*, 325(5939), 419–422.

Rudel, T. K. (2019). *Shocks, States, and Sustainability: The Origins of Radical Environmental Reforms*. Oxford University Press, ch. 6.

Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*. Cambridge University Press.

Schneiberg, M., & Clemens, E. S. (2006). The Typical Tools for the Job: Research Strategies in Institutional Analysis*. *Sociological Theory*, 24(3), 195–227.

Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. (1997). Structuring a Theory of Moral Sentiments; Institutional and Organizational Coevolution in the Early Thrift Industry. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(6), 1606–1651

Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional Theories of Organization. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 13(1), 443–464.

Class 8 - 1/30 - Foundations 1.8 - Deregulation, Reregulation, Private RegulationPrimary Readings:

1. Jones, D. (2013). Bottling the genie: Why deregulation is easy and reregulation is hard. *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, April.
2. Schneiberg, M., & Bartley, T. (2008). Organizations, regulation, and economic behavior: Regulatory dynamics and forms from the nineteenth to twenty-first century. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 4(1), 31–61.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Read “What does ‘deregulation’ actually mean in the Trump era?” published in 2017 by the Brookings Institution.

Supplemental Readings:

Vogel, S. (1996). *Freer markets, more rules: Regulatory reform in advanced industrial countries*. Cornell University Press, pp. 1–42.

Jordana, J., & Levi-Faur, D. (2004). The politics of regulation in the age of governance. In J. Jordana & D. Levi-Faur (Eds.), *The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance* (Chap. 1, pp. 1–28). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Levi-Faur, D. (2010). Regulation and Regulatory Governance. *Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, February 2010*(1), 1–47.

Vogel, D. (2005). *The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social responsibility*. Brookings Institution Press.

Soule, S. A. (2009). *Contention and corporate social responsibility*. Cambridge University Press.

Vogel, D. (2008). Private Global Business Regulation. *Annual Review of Political Science, 11*(1), 261–282.

Trebing, H. M. (2008). A Critical Assessment of Electricity and Natural Gas Deregulation. *Journal of Economic Issues, 42*(2), 469–477.

Derthick, M., & Quirk, P. J. (2001). *The Politics of Deregulation*. Brookings Institution Press.

Wacquant, L. (2012). Three steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism. *Social Anthropology, 20*(1), 66–79.

Castree, N. (2008). Neoliberalising nature: The logics of deregulation and reregulation. *Environment and Planning A, 40*(1), 131–152.

Part 2: Complicating the BasicsWeek 5 - The Endogeneity of Law and Regulation

Class 9 - 2/4 - Complicating 1.1 - Which Comes First: Law or Compliance?Primary Readings:

1. Dobbin, F., & Sutton, J. R. (1998). The strength of a weak state: The rights revolution and the rise of human resources management divisions. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104(2), 441–476.
2. Edelman, L. B., Uggan, C., & Erlanger, H. S. (1999). The endogeneity of legal regulation: Grievance procedures as rational myth. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(2), 406–54.

Examples to think with (required):

3. There is no ‘idea to think with’ for this class, but, for those of you who have experience training a pet, think carefully about the implications that the argument by Edelman et al. (1999) (and possibly Dobbin and Sutton (1998)) has for how that training process *actually* works. Who designs the rules for the pet to follow? Who decides what compliance “looks like”? How does a particular means of “complying” with a rule become institutionalized (taken for granted as legitimate and acceptable) for both you and the pet?

Supplemental Readings:

Edelman, L. B. (1992). Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational mediation of civil rights law. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(6), 1531–1576.

Short, J. L., & Toffel, M. W. (2010). Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55(3), 361–396.

Class 10 - 2/6 - Complicating 1.2 - Business Influence and Regulatory ArbitragePrimary Readings:

1. Rao, H., Yue, L. Q., & Ingram, P. (2011). Laws of attraction regulatory arbitrage in the face of activism in right-to-work states. *American Sociological Review*, 76(3), 365–385.
2. Roy, W. G. (1981a). The vesting of interests and the determinants of political power: Size, network structure, and mobilization of american industries, 1886-1905. *American Journal of Sociology*, 86(6), 1287–1310.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Gleason, P. (2020). Virginia democrats want to repeal right-to-work law. in illinois they want to ban it. tennessee republicans instead seek to constitutionally protect it. *Forbes.com*, January 31.
4. Skorup, J. (2020). Unions decline again — and public-sector right-to-work may be a reason. *The Hill*, January 31.

Note: You can quickly skim both pieces; focus slightly more on the first one.

Supplemental Readings:

Walker, E. T., & Rea, C. M. (2014). The political mobilization of firms and industries. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 40(1).

Rao, H. (2009). *Market rebels: How activists make or break radical innovations*. Princeton University Press.

Ingram, P., & Rao, H. (2004). Store wars: The enactment and repeal of anti-chain-store legislation in america. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(2), 446–487.

Meckling, J. (2011). *Carbon coalitions: Business, climate politics, and the rise of emissions trading*. MIT Press.

Week 6 - Autonomy Revisited: Insider Activists and Institutional Entrepreneurs**Class 11 - 2/11 - Complicating 1.3 - Bureaucrat Activists: Change from Within**Primary Readings:

1. Pacewicz, J. (2018). The Regulatory Road to Reform: Bureaucratic Activism, Agency Advocacy, and Medicaid Expansion within the Delegated Welfare State. *Politics & Society*, 46(4), 571–601.
2. Abers, R. N. (2019). Bureaucratic activism: Pursuing environmentalism inside the brazilian state. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 61(2), 21–44.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Please scroll through the Rogue EPA Staff Twitter Feed, accessible here: <https://twitter.com/rogeepastaff>

Supplemental Readings:

Harrison, J. L. (2017). ‘We do ecology, not sociology’: Interactions among bureaucrats and the undermining of regulatory agencies’ environmental justice efforts. *Environmental Sociology*, 3(3), 197–212.

Lee, C. K., & Zhang, Y. (2013). The power of instability: Unraveling the microfoundations of bargained authoritarianism in china. *American Journal of Sociology*, 118(6), 1475–1508.

Myers, J. E., & Kellogg, K. C. (2018). Administrative Activists: The Role of State Actors in Organizational Change. *Academy of Management Proceedings*, 2018(1), 12247. *This piece is still in process and not published yet, but you can read the abstract here: <https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.12247abstract>*

Katzenstein, M. F. (1998). *Faithful and fearless*. Princeton University Press.

Lave, R. (2012). Bridging Political Ecology and STS: A Field Analysis of the Rosgen Wars. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 102(2), 366–382.

Class 12 - 2/13 - Complicating 1.4 - Institutional EntrepreneursPrimary Readings:

1. Anderson, E. (2018). Policy Entrepreneurs and the Origins of the Regulatory Welfare State: Child Labor Reform in Nineteenth-Century Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 83(1), 173–211.
2. Garud, R., Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2007). Institutional entrepreneurship as embedded agency: An introduction to the special issue. *Organization Studies*, 28(7), 957–969.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Watch *The Big Burn*, a documentary about a large forest fire in the early 20th century, the opportunities it created for policy reform, and the institutional entrepreneurship that drove those changes.

Supplemental Readings:

Hallett, T., & Ventresca, M. J. (2006). Inhabited Institutions: Social Interactions and Organizational Forms in Gouldner's "Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy". *Theory and Society*, 35(2), 213–236.

DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), *Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment* (pp. 3–21). Ballinger Pub. Co.

Gouldner, A. W. (1964). *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (1st edition). New York: Free Press.

Week 7 - The Organization of Administrative Politics

Class 13 - 2/18 - Complicating 1.5 - The Organization of Regulatory PoliticsPrimary Readings:

1. Halfmann, D. (2011). *Doctors and demonstrators: How political institutions shape abortion law in the united states, britain, and canada*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, pp. 1–65.

Note: Only one primary reading this class.

Examples to think with (required):

2. Turner, J. M., & Isenberg, A. C. (2018). *The republican reversal: Conservatives and the environment from nixon to trump* (1 edition). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–18.

Note: This is an accessibly written academic book; you can focus your attention on just a few pages, from the end of p. 11 to the end of the last full paragraph on p. 13.

Supplemental Readings:

Campbell, J. L., & Pedersen, O. K. (2014). *The national origins of policy ideas: Knowledge regimes in the united states, france, germany, and denmark*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, esp. pp. 1-35, optional pp. 39-84.

Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). *Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage*. OUP Oxford.

Levi-Faur, D. (2006). Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism: Getting the Most Out of the Comparative Method. *Governance*, 19(3), 367–382.

Meckling, J., & Jenner, S. (2016). Varieties of market-based policy: Instrument choice in climate policy. *Environmental Politics*, 25(5), 853–874.

McCaffrey, D. P. (1982). Corporate Resources and Regulatory Pressures: Toward Explaining a Discrepancy. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 27(3), 398–419.

Class 14 - 2/20 - Complicating 1.6 - Social Movements and Regulatory ChangePrimary Readings:

1. Soule, S. A., & King, B. G. (2006). The Stages of the Policy Process and the Equal Rights Amendment, 1972–1982. *American Journal of Sociology*, 111(6), 1871–1909.
2. Bartley, T., & Child, C. (2014). Shaming the corporation: The social production of targets and the anti-sweatshop movement. *American Sociological Review*, 79(4), 653–679.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Meyer, R. (2017). The standing rock sioux claim ‘victory and vindication’ in court. *The Atlantic*, June 14.

Supplemental Readings:

Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. (1994). A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39(1), 141–173.

Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(01), 57–85.

Dryzek, J., Downs, D., Hunold, C., Schlosberg, D., & Hernes, H.-K. (2003). *Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway* (1 edition). Oxford u.a.: Oxford University Press.

King, B. G., & Pearce, N. A. (2010). The contentiousness of markets: Politics, social movements, and institutional change in markets. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36, 249–267.

Soule, S. A. (2012). Social movements and markets, industries, and firms. *Organization Studies*, 33(12), 1715–1733

Rao, H., Morrill, C., & Zald, M. N. (2000). Power plays: How social movements and collective action create new organizational forms. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 22, 237–282.

Week 8 - Feedbacks and Unintended Consequences

Class 15 - 2/25 - Complicating 1.7 - CountermovementsPrimary Readings:

1. Polanyi, K. ([1944] 2001). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time*. Beacon Press, pp. 71–80.
2. Polanyi, K. ([1944] 2001). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time*. Beacon Press, pp. 136–140, 201–209.

Note: The readings for this class are short but they are dense and it is important that you read them carefully. Polanyi has a very specific theory of where “countermovements” come from; I want us to be clear about his account. Hint: his ideas are more specific than what most of us think of when we think of countermovements. Understanding the concept of “fictitious commodities” (defined in the first of the two selections) in particular is crucial for understanding Polanyi’s account.

Examples to think with (required):

The most directly applied “ideas to think with” are in pages 201-209 in the second Polanyi reading above, on central banking. The chapter might be a little confusing, but it applies Polanyi’s concepts directly to the regulation of money in the economy in a fundamental way. See below for definitions that might help make the reading *slightly* clearer.

In addition, I strongly encourage you to listen to a really interesting discussion of attempts to regulate the money supply in Brazil, as told in a [Planet Money podcast](#).

The Polanyian “countermovement” is a little hidden in the story, but it’s lurking beneath the surface of the podcast—and the story is interesting enough to listen to either way.

Definitions to help clarify Polanyi’s ideas in pp. 201-209:

Commodity money - a commodity that happens to function as a medium of exchange. For example, coins literally made of gold or silver, or, in a hypothetical society where livestock are units of exchange, cows or goats or whatever. This is the closest money comes to simple barter; the crucial difference is that in a commodity money system, a single (or limited set) of commodities are agreed upon as universal carriers of value, whereas in a barter system, exchanges are individually negotiated and can be made with different goods. E.g., a barter system might involve directly trading livestock (one commodity) for milled grain (a different commodity), while a commodity money system would involve the trade of gold coins (a specific commodity used as a universal medium of exchange) as a means of purchasing both livestock and grain. The supply of commodity money is limited by the physical availability of the commodity itself: without the physical good, you can’t have money at all!

Bank money - also known as representative money, is money with an explicit link to a physical commodity, often gold, even when the physical representation of the money itself (the token; see below) may be less valuable than the commodity it represents. Think: paper money “backed up” by gold. Note that technically, the supply of bank money is still linked to the supply of the commodity that it is linked to. Thus, for example, printing money—increasing the supply of bank notes—without increasing the supply of the commodity “behind it” just decreases the value of the bank money. This dynamic is directly related to inflation/currency depreciation.

Fiat money - money with no explicit link to a physical commodity; its value comes from an institutionalized agreement/understanding on the part of its users that the money carries value—that’s it! Fiat money is NOT linked to gold or anything else that is physical. Think: modern money used around the world today. Note that the decoupling of fiat money from physical commodities means that its supply can be adjusted somewhat more easily. Printing money might still cause inflation/currency depreciation, but that depends upon how the users of the money *perceive* the changing supply. The relationship between money supply and inflation is much more complex here!

Token money - Money where the physical piece of money—a piece of paper or a coin, for example—stands in as a “token” for value. The value of the token itself—a cheap piece of metal or a flimsy piece of paper—is usually much less than the value it represents. Token money can be either bank money or fiat money: it can represent value “backed up” by a physical commodity (bank/representative money) or a socially agreed-upon value with no inherent link to any physical good (fiat money).

Supplemental Readings:

Harris, K., & Scully, B. (2015). A hidden counter-movement? Precarity, politics, and social protection before and beyond the neoliberal era. *Theory and Society*, 44(5), 415–444.

Silver, B. J. (2003). *Forces of labor: Workers’ movements and globalization since 1870*. Cambridge University Press.

Carton, W. (2014). Environmental Protection as Market Pathology?: Carbon Trading and the Dialectics of the ‘Double Movement’. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 32(6), 1002–1018.

Fraser, N. (2014). Can society be commodities all the way down? Post-Polanyian reflections on capitalist crisis. *Economy and Society*, 43(4), 541–558.

Rea, C. M. (2019). The eu emissions trading scheme: Protection via commodification? *Culture, Practice, and Europeanization*, 4(1), 48–73.

Meyer, D. S., & Staggenborg, S. (1996). Movements, countermovements, and the structure of political opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101(6), 1628–1660.

Class 16 - 2/27 - Complicating 1.8 - Political Backlash and Regulatory Resentment

Primary Readings:

1. Hochschild, A. R. (2016). *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* (1 edition). New York: The New Press, pp. 8–16, 55–82, 277–279.

Note: As with the Polanyi reading for Tuesday’s class, it’s important for you to do this class’s primary reading carefully—that’s why I’ve only assigned one reading. If you’re interested and want a more thorough picture of (conservative) anti-environmental regulatory resentment, though, I highly recommend the Judith Layzer (2012, pp. 31–81) *Open for Business* reading, which is ch. 3 of her excellent book. It’s the first listing under Supplemental Readings. Layzer’s account is almost essential to more fully understand the history and politics that remains largely implicit in Hochschild’s book.

Examples to think with (required):

2. Watch “[War on the EPA](#)”, produced by PBS *Frontline*. Think carefully about how this documentary and the dynamics it emphasizes relate to the arguments made by Hochschild (2016).

Supplemental Readings:

Layzer, J. A. (2012). *Open for Business: Conservatives’ Opposition to Environmental Regulation*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 31–81.

Cramer, K. J. (2016). *The Politics of Resentment*. The University of Chicago Press.

Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). *Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Prasad, M. (2012). *The land of too much*. Harvard University Press.

Cooper, P. J. (2009). *The war against regulation: From Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush*. University Press of Kansas.

Part 3: Wicked Problems, Here and NowWeek 9 - Environmental Protection

Class 17 - 3/3 - Wicked 1.1 - Clean Air and Clean Water (?) 50 Years LaterPrimary Readings:

1. Keiser, D. A., & Shapiro, J. S. (2019). US Water Pollution Regulation over the Past Half Century: Burning Waters to Crystal Springs? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33(4), 51–75.
2. Currie, J., & Walker, R. (2019). What Do Economists Have to Say about the Clean Air Act 50 Years after the Establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33(4), 3–26.

Examples to think with (required):

N/A - The two primary readings themselves are filled with “ideas to think with.” These two readings are also much less conceptual and much more descriptive (as opposed to theoretical and explanatory) than most other readings so far.

Supplemental Readings:

- Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. *Journal of Law and Economy*, 3, 1–44.
- Dales, J. H. (1968). *Pollution, property & prices: An essay in policy-making and economics*. Edward Elgar Pub.
- Goulder, L. H. (2013). Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the (New) Lessons? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27(1), 87–102.
- Vogel, D. (2012). *The politics of precaution: Regulating health, safety, and environmental risks in europe and the united states*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Rea, C. M. (2017). Theorizing command-and-commodify regulation: The case of species conservation banking in the united states. *Theory and Society*, 46(1), 21–56.

Class 18 - 3/5 - Wicked 1.2 - Markets in Nature to Save Nature From Markets?Primary Readings:

1. Lederer, M. (2012). Market making via regulation: The role of the state in carbon markets. *Regulation & Governance*, 6(4), 524–544.
2. Schmalensee, R., & Stavins, R. (2012). *The SO₂ Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment* (Working Paper No. 18306). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Costanza, R., d'Arge, R., De Groot, R., Farber, S., Grasso, M., Hannon, B., ... van den Belt, M. (1997). The value of the world's ecosystem services and natural capital. *Nature*, 387(6630), 253–260.

Note: This is a really, really famous paper—just skim to get the major ideas!

Supplemental Readings:

Vatn, A. (2015). Markets in environmental governance: From theory to practice. *Ecological Economics*, 117, 225–233.

Dempsey, J., & Suarez, D. C. (2016). Arrested development? the promises and paradoxes of “selling nature to save it”. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 106(3), 653–671.

Smith, N. (2007). Nature as accumulation strategy. *Socialist Register*, 2007, 16.

Rea, C. M. (2017). Theorizing command-and-commodify regulation: The case of species conservation banking in the united states. *Theory and Society*, 46(1), 21–56.

Goulder, L. H. (2013). Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the (New) Lessons? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27(1), 87–102.

Spring Break: No Class 3/10 or 3/12

Week 10 - Climate Change and Global Supply Chains

Class 19 - 3/17 - Wicked 1.3 - Environment and Transnational Private RegulationPrimary Readings:

1. Bartley, T. (2007). Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: The rise of transnational private regulation of labor and environmental conditions. *American Journal of Sociology*, 113(2), 297–351.
2. Longhofer, W., Schofer, E., Miric, N., & Frank, D. J. (2016). NGOs, INGOs, and environmental policy reform, 1970–2010. *Social Forces*, 94(4), 1743–1768.

Examples to think with (required):

Watch *Decoding the Weather Machine*, produced by PBS. The documentary focuses on the science and problems of climate change, but as you watch, consider the generalized challenges of regulating any problem—in this instance, climate change—that transcends national borders in a world where nation-states remain the primary unit of political and thus regulatory control. Consider both state-driven and “private” sources of regulation; think especially carefully about how state and non-state forms of regulation can interact, per the insights of two primary readings (see also Bartley (2014) in the supplemental readings below). Also consider how regulation at different scales—from cities to the UN—interacts. In short, climate is the example, but what are the generalized lessons we can draw from it?

Supplemental Readings:

Bartley, T. (2014). Transnational governance and the re-centered state: Sustainability or legality? *Regulation & Governance*, 8(1), 93–109.

Cashore, B. W., Auld, G., & Newsom, D. (Eds.). (2004). *Governing through markets: Forest certification and the emergence of non-state authority*. Yale University Press.

Class 20 - 3/19 - Wicked 1.4 - Global Supply ChainsPrimary Readings:

1. Distelhorst, G., Locke, R. M., Pal, T., & Samel, H. (2015). Production goes global, compliance stays local: Private regulation in the global electronics industry. *Regulation & Governance*, 9(3), 224–242.
2. Samford, S. (2015). Innovation and public space: The developmental possibilities of regulation in the global south. *Regulation & Governance*, 9(3), 294–308.

Examples to think with (required):

Watch John Oliver's *Last Week Tonight* "Fashion" episode, available freely on YouTube and which originally aired in 2015. As with the climate documentary from last class, think carefully about the regulatory challenges that lurk behind the issues Oliver discusses.

Supplemental Readings:

If you'd like to watch a more complete—and gut-wrenching—documentary on the global apparel industry, consider watching [The True Cost](#) (2015), available on *iTunes*, *Amazon Prime*, and so on.

Locke, R. M. (2013). *The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global economy*. Cambridge University Press.

 Week 11 - Anti-Trust and Finance in the New Gilded Age

Class 21 - 3/24 - Wicked 1.5 - Anti-Trust and BankingPrimary Readings:

1. Dobbin, F., & Dowd, T. J. (2000). The market that antitrust built: Public policy, private coercion, and railroad acquisitions, 1825 to 1922. *American Sociological Review*, 65(5), 631.
2. Kovacic, W. E., & Shapiro, C. (2000). Antitrust policy: A century of economic and legal thinking. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(1), 43–60.

Examples to think with (required):

3. Watch [Fair Fight in the Marketplace](#), a short, simple documentary on anti-trust law in the United States. Note that the documentary is not sophisticated; per Dobbin (1994) from earlier in the course, it is shot through with implicit politically and culturally particular assumptions about how markets “should” work. Still, the film provides a useful overview of the basic, stylized history of anti-trust law in the United States. Indeed, part of the richness of the documentary for us will be exactly in interrogating these assumptions!

Supplemental Readings:

Roy, W. G. (1981b). The Vesting of Interests and the Determinants of Political Power: Size, Network Structure, and Mobilization of American Industries, 1886-1905. *American Journal of Sociology*, 86(6), 1287–1310.

Class 22 - 3/26 - Wicked 1.6 - Decreasing State Control in FinancePrimary Readings:

1. Funk, R. J., & Hirschman, D. (2014). Derivatives and deregulation: Financial innovation and the demise of glass–steagall. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 59(4), 669–704.
2. Yue, L. Q., Luo, J., & Ingram, P. (2013). The Failure of Private Regulation: Elite Control and Market Crises in the Manhattan Banking Industry. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(1), 37–68.

Examples to think with (required):

Watch [Panic: The Untold Story of the 2008 Financial Crisis](#), a fascinating documentary on the 2008 financial crisis produced by VICE News and HBO released in 2019.

Supplemental Readings:

Kim Pernell, Jiwook Jung, & Frank Dobbin. (2017). The Hazards of Expert Control: Chief Risk Officers and Risky Derivatives. *American Sociological Review*, 82(3), 511–541.

Krippner, G. R. (2011). *Capitalizing on crisis: The political origins of the rise of finance*. Harvard University Press.

Week 12 - The Classic Case of Public Utilities

Dr. Doug Jones, Enarson Professor of Public Policy (Emeritus) and Director (Emeritus) of the National Regulatory Research Institute, is tentatively scheduled to guest-lecture this week. Readings are subject to change.

Class 23 - 3/31 - Wicked 1.7 - Public Utilities, Part 1Primary Readings:

1. Joskow, P. L. (2012). Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(1), 29–48.
2. Jones, D. N. (2006). Agency transformation and state public utility commissions. *Utilities Policy*, 14(1), 8–13.

Examples to think with (required):

TBD

Supplemental Readings:

Joskow, P. L., & Schmalensee, R. (1988). *Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electrical Utility Deregulation*. The MIT Press.

Phillips, Jr., C. F. (1984). *The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory and Practice*. Public Utilities Reports, Incorporated.

Class 24 - 4/2 - Wicked 1.8 - Public Utilities, Part 2Primary Readings:

TBD

Examples to think with (required):

TBD

Supplemental Readings:

TBD

Week 13 - Privacy and Control in an Era of Mass Surveillance

Class 25 - 4/7 - Wicked 1.9 - Mass SurveillancePrimary Readings:

1. Fourcade, M., & Healy, K. (2017). Seeing like a market. *Socio-Economic Review*, 15(1), 9–29.

Note: Only one primary reading this week; read it carefully. You may want to first read the “idea to think with,” below, to have that example in the back of your mind as you read Fourcade and Healy (2017).

Examples to think with (required):

2. Thompson, S. A., & Warzel, C. (2019). Opinion — Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy. *The New York Times*, December 19.

Note: It’s absolutely critical for you to read this “idea to think with.” DO NOT skip this “idea to think with.”

Supplemental Readings:

Hu, M. (2017). From the National Surveillance State to the Cybersurveillance State. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 13(1), 161–180.

Ferguson, A. G. (2017). *The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law Enforcement*. Google-Books-ID: PMSSDgAAQBAJ. NYU Press.

Marx, G. T., & Muschert, G. W. (2007). Personal Information, Borders, and the New Surveillance Studies. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 3(1), 375–395.

West, J. P., & Bowman, J. S. (2016). The Domestic Use of Drones: An Ethical Analysis of Surveillance Issues. *Public Administration Review*, 76(4), 649–659.

Lyon, D. (2004). Globalizing Surveillance: Comparative and Sociological Perspectives. *International Sociology*, 19(2), 135–149.

Mayer, J., Mutchler, P., & Mitchell, J. C. (2016). Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 113(20), 5536–5541.

Ball, K., Lyon, D., & Haggerty, K. D. (2012). *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*. Google-Books-ID: GHO493HCDXQC. Routledge.

Sewell, G. (1998). The Discipline of Teams: The Control of Team-Based Industrial Work through Electronic and Peer Surveillance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43(2), 397–428.

Class 26 - 4/9 - Wicked 1.10 - Privacy and TransparencyPrimary Readings:

1. Anthony, D., Campos-Castillo, C., & Horne, C. (2017). Toward a Sociology of Privacy. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 43(1), 249–269.
2. Narayanan, A., Huey, J., & Felten, E. W. (2016). A Precautionary Approach to Big Data Privacy. In S. Gutwirth, R. Leenes, & P. De Hert (Eds.), *Data Protection on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection* (pp. 357–385). Law, Governance and Technology Series.

Examples to think with (required):

TBD

Supplemental Readings:

- Brian, D. (2014). The Transparent Obama Administration? *Public Administration Review*, 74(1), 8–9.
- Moore, S. (2018). Towards a Sociology of Institutional Transparency: Openness, Deception and the Problem of Public Trust. *Sociology*, 52(2), 416–430.
- Peisakhin, L., & Pinto, P. (2010). Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in India. *Regulation & Governance*, 4(3), 261–280.
- Englehardt, S., Reisman, D., Eubank, C., Zimmerman, P., Mayer, J., Narayanan, A., & Felten, E. W. (2015). Cookies that give you away: The surveillance implications of web tracking. In *Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on World Wide Web* (pp. 289–299). International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee.
- Robinson, D., Yu, H., Zeller, W. P., & Felten, E. W. (2008). Government Data and the Invisible Hand. *Yale Journal of Law and Technology*, 11, 159.

Week 14 - Algorithms and New Forms of Control

Class 27 - 4/14 - Wicked 1.11 - Algorithms and New Forms of ControlPrimary Readings:

1. Tzur, A. (2019). Uber über regulation? Regulatory change following the emergence of new technologies in the taxi market. *Regulation & Governance*, 13(3), 340–361.
2. Yeung, K. (2018). Algorithmic regulation: A critical interrogation. *Regulation & Governance*, 12(4), 505–523.

Examples to think with (required):

TBD

Supplemental Readings:

- Kroll, J. A., Barocas, S., Felten, E. W., Reidenberg, J. R., Robinson, D. G., & Yu, H. (2016). Accountable Algorithms. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 165, 633.
- Lee, C. K., & Kofman, Y. (2012). The Politics of Precarity: Views Beyond the United States. *Work and Occupations*, 39(4), 388–408.
- Stewart, A., & Stanford, J. (2017). Regulating work in the gig economy: What are the options? *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, 28(3), 420–437.

Class 28 - 4/16 Wicked 1.12 - Wrapping up: Final Thoughts and Considerations

No Reading

Weeks 15 & 16 - Final Project Due 4/24 at 11:59:59
